

Social Networks as a Political Resource: Revisiting Korean Democratic Transition

Joon Nak Choi and Ji Yeon Hong

Abstract

In this paper, we study how political parties react to democratic transition and find that social network structure plays a critical role in shaping political interactions and consequently, the post-transition party systems that emerge. We focus on the Korean case, where the incumbent authoritarian party merged with one of its pro-democracy opponents to create a powerful and enduring conservative party under democratic rule. Using a novel individual-level dataset on all legislative members during the transition, we find that this merger was facilitated by the dense social networks linking members of the merged parties, which increased trust across the pre-merger parties and reduced the difficulty of a merger. Conversely, we also find that the paucity of ties linking pro-democracy parties hindered long-term cooperation between these parties despite their shared ideologies and policy goals.

Keywords: party formation, social networks, democratic transition, authoritarian successor party, South Korea

How do political parties respond to democratic transition? More specifically, how do former authoritarian parties survive through democratic transitions, when countries implement competitive elections and abolish institutional advantages favoring authoritarian regimes? Although democratic transitions might be expected to weaken the incumbent political parties associated with authoritarian regimes, many such parties have performed surprisingly well in the competitive elections that follow. Prior research has invoked rational choice theory to explain how post-authoritarian parties paradoxically maintain power through democratic transitions (Cheng 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010, 2012; Slater and Wong 2014; McCann 2015), focusing on the strategic incentives authoritarian leaders face, and how these incentives affect post-authoritarian parties and political systems. Yet, these studies have largely neglected crucial social factors that both enable and constrain strategic decisions during democratic transitions.

In this study, we investigate how social networks both enable and constrain the strategic decisions of post-authoritarian and challenger parties during democratic transition. Social ties are concrete manifestations of trust and reciprocity (Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1988; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993) that facilitate strategic actions such as resource exchanges and alliances (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Tsai 2000). Conversely, the lack of social ties indicates a lack of trust, where collective action is constrained by agency and transaction costs (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Burt 1992). Thus, the analysis of social network structure--the pattern formed by the presence or absence of ties--would reveal much about the incentive structures that rational actors face.¹ In the context of democratic transition, we argue that social networks play a crucial role in party politics, shaping the strategic options available to party leaders in an emerging institutional context. In particular, the ties with economic, social and political elites built by post-authoritarian parties while in power become important resources during democratic transitions enabling these

parties to defend their positions and vested interests.

Towards this end, we investigate how political parties respond to institutional changes during South Korea's democratic transition, and how their choices cannot be explained without taking social networks into consideration. Massive street protests forced the authoritarian regime to hold free and fair elections for the Presidency in 1987 and for the National Assembly in 1988. Yet, the post-authoritarian Democratic Justice Party (DJP) won the Presidency in 1987 because the democratic opposition unexpectedly splintered into rival parties fielding separate candidates, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), and enabled the DJP's candidate to win with only 36.6 percent of the vote. The post-authoritarians even took a two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly in 1990, when the RDP merged with the DJP to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). These outcomes raise two crucial questions. Why did a unified democratic opposition splinter into the RDP and the PPD, and why did the RDP cross ideological lines to merge with the DJP rather than their ideological allies in the PPD? Previous studies (e.g. Cotton 1992; Kim 1997; Slater and Wong 2014) explained these outcomes as rational choices made by party leaders to advance their individual interests. Yet, these studies leave key questions unanswered. Why did the observed merger take place instead of others that offered even stronger strategic incentives? Also, why did rank-and-file members fail to challenge decisions that advanced their leaders' individual interests at the expense of shared policy and ideological objectives? We found that informal but nevertheless tangible ties between RDP and the DJP members gave their leaders the common ground needed for a merger that cut across ideological boundaries, while the absence of ties ruled out other potential combinations.

Theoretical Perspectives

What factors determine the dynamics of political parties during democratic transitions? While prior studies have widely recognized that stable party systems are crucial during democratic consolidation (Kitschelt et al. 1999, Diamond and Linz 1989), party dynamics during democratic transition have yet to receive a thorough investigation although party systems during democratic transition are known to be volatile (Tavits 2008). Indeed, the creation of new parties, the collapse of existing parties and other forms of party instability are rare in established democracies, but are far more common during democratic transitions (Harmel and Robertson 1985, Tavits 2008). The end of authoritarian repression enables the formation of new political parties, or at least, the legal incorporation of previously illegal parties that emerge into the open (Tien 1996; Olson 1998, Van Biezen 2005). Opposition parties that had been tolerated but limited could transform themselves into fully functional parties (Levitsky and Way 2010; 2012). Also, the institutional uncertainty characterizing democratic transitions facilitate party mergers and splits (Kim 1997). Why certain parties are formed and sustained during democratic transition while others fail to emerge or last has yet to be explained, however, although strategic entry (Hug 2001) and voter support (Tavit 2008) have both been found to be crucial.

Political parties have traditionally been viewed as groups of individuals cooperating to enact shared ideologies and policy platforms on one hand, and maximize their political power on the other hand. Individuals who share the same political ideologies sort themselves into ideologically homogeneous parties, partly because people who share similar views tend to sort themselves into homophilous groups (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001) and partly because ideologically cohesive parties tend to be more effective, exhibiting party discipline and remaining aligned in legislative voting (Powell 2000, Poole & Rosenthal 2001, Poole 2005, Hix

et al. 2007). Thus, a fundamental premise in party formation is that party members share similar ideologies (Janda 1980), making cross-party differences reflect ideological cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1990). Nevertheless, ideological homogeneity within political parties tends to be much weaker than it might first appear (Kirshner 1966), suggesting that mechanisms other than ideology also shape party boundaries. For this reason, a large literature (Duverger 1954; Downs 1957; Aldrich 1995) has applied rational choice theory to party formation and mergers. Political scientists (Michels 1915) have long suggested that party leaders may care more about their own electoral survival than the implementation of their parties' policy platforms. Consequently, electoral success can be taken as the fundamental goal of political parties and the key factor shaping party systems (Duverger 1954; Downs 1957). This opens the door to parties having much greater ideological diversity than might be expected.

Ideology and interests both bear upon inter-party dynamics. On one hand, ideologically similar parties tend to be more likely to cooperate and merge. Examples include the 1981 merger between the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Alliance in United Kingdom (Denver 1983, Studlar and McAllister 2006), the 1987 formation of the UMP in France, and the 2003 merger between the Progressive-Conservative and the Reform/Canadian Alliance parties in Canada (Belanger and Godbout 2010, Marland and Flanagan 2013). On the other hand, ideologically dissimilar parties may ally to maximize electoral outcomes and terms in office and desired policy decisions (for reviews of coalition theory, see Strom 1990; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). For example, communist successor parties in 1990s Eastern Europe often cooperated with nationalist parties (Ishiyama 1998). Empirical evidence suggests that the same mechanisms might also drive party mergers, even though mergers represent a more fundamental and longer-term commitment than coalitions (Belanger and Godbout 2010).²

Exactly how ideology and rational choices drive inter-party dynamics depends greatly on the context. Simon (1985) suggests that rational choices are easily predicted once the incentive structure becomes known, emphasizing the need for detailed research on empirical contexts. Indeed, coalition theorists have emphasized that incentive structures account for the choice of coalition partners, and that different incentives generate different coalition patterns. Notably, the incentive structure largely determines whether parties are vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking, which has important effects on their coalition strategies (Strom 1990). Indeed, research on coalitions (Aldrich 1995; Kohno 1997) has paid close attention to the empirical context and the incentive structures they generate, linking them directly to observed outcomes. Thus, it is perhaps surprising that the literature on coalitions has paid so little attention to one of the most important and relevant aspects of the empirical context, the structure of the social networks linking political actors with one another.

Social networks both enable and constrain the strategic actions of individuals and organizations alike. Social networks are constituted of actors (i.e. nodes) and the social ties linking them. Sociologists and organizational theorists have found that the presence or absence of a tie between any two nodes matters greatly, because actors who know and like one another tend to trust and perhaps look out for one another (e.g. Granovetter 1985). Political scientists have also begun to recognize the importance of social networks. While studies have examined network dynamics across several different political arenas (Knoke 1994; Ward, Stoval and Sacks 2011), two research streams bear directly on our focus on party dynamics. One stream has focused on friendship networks within legislatures. Caldeira and Patterson (1987: 969) studied the Iowa state legislature, and found it “a well-oiled network of political friends”. Legislators were more likely to develop friendships not only when they shared similar attitudes, but also had

similar backgrounds and experiences. Arnold, Deen and Patterson (2000) found that political friendships significantly influenced voting patterns in the Ohio state legislature, even after controlling for political and socio-demographic characteristics. A second research stream focuses on the role of interpersonal networks in party formation. Padgett and Ansell (1993) investigated the formation of the Medici party in Renaissance Florence, and found that a governing coalition centered on the Medici family originated from the interpersonal ties of Cosimo de Medici, who cultivated different types of ties with different types of political actors. Leveraging his trust relationships, Cosimo de Medici forged a political party that governed Florence for decades.

Given the political uncertainty characterizing democratic transitions, social ties should exert important effects on political parties during democratic transitions. The interpersonal trust found between connected individuals can greatly facilitate collective actions to create new parties and inter-organizational cooperation to merge two parties together in the uncertain conditions characterizing democratic transitions. As dense ties increase a group's cohesiveness (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; Coleman 1988), more densely-connected groups should more likely to coalesce into political parties. Once incorporated into a party, densely-connected groups should also be more likely to remain together in that party, without splitting into rival parties or collapsing altogether. Similarly, dense ties across different groups (Zhao and Anand 2013) should facilitate trust and communication between these groups, and increase their likelihood of cooperating or even merging (Granovetter 1995). The lack of dense ties, however, should reduce this likelihood.

We propose that these insights regarding social network structure enable and constrain the types of strategic action proposed by rational choice theorists. Consistent with Simon (1985), Knoke (1994) and Ostrom (1998), we view rational choice and social network explanations as

natural complements. Although social ties can emerge from a wide variety of social interactions (Granovetter 1985), social ties facilitate cooperation between individuals and organizations regardless of their origins, lowering agency and other transaction costs (Baker 1990; Powell 1990; Uzzi 1996, 1997). Thus, the presence or absence of social ties should bear greatly upon the incentives faced by political leaders when making strategic decisions.

Revisiting Korean Democratic Transition

In 1987, President Chun Doo Hwan, authoritarian leader of South Korea at the time, faced a critical decision. Constitutionally barred from renewing his tenure, Chun had designated his friend and longtime lieutenant Roh Tae-Woo as his successor. Chun's plans to transfer power to Roh, however, were being vigorously contested student protesters who had quickly gained support from labor unions, religious groups and political parties. By June, even office workers had joined the protests, and well over a million protesters paralyzed the nation. With international attention focused on Korea and in danger of losing the 1988 Summer Olympics, Chun could not militarily suppress the uprising. Lacking other viable options, on June 29th, Roh announced institutional reforms including free and competitive elections. Instead of inheriting Chun's authoritarian regime in rubber-stamp elections, Roh and the post-authoritarian DJP would have to win competitive elections.

Roh faced longtime opposition leaders Kim Young-sam (YS) and Kim Dae-jung (DJ), as well as former authoritarian Kim Jong-pil (JP). Although YS and DJ had competed against one another for leadership of pro-democracy forces since the 1960s, YS and DJ had united against Chun. In April 1987, YS and DJ created the RDP and led June's street protests together. Roh was also opposed by JP, another authoritarian leader who had been Chun's rival until being purged

and placed under house arrest. JP rallied other post-authoritarian figures purged by Chun, and formed the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) in 1987. Despite such opposition, Roh won the presidency in 1987 and even gained control over a two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly by 1990, aided by two counter-intuitive events.

First, the pro-democracy figures snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. DJ and his followers defected from the RDP and formed the PPD in October 1987, two month before the presidential election. As rival presidential candidates, YS and DJ split the pro-democracy vote in the December 1987 presidential election, respectively earning 28.0 and 27.0 percent of the vote. This allowed Roh to win the presidency with only 36.6 percent of the vote. Similarly, in the April 1988 legislative election, the DJP won the largest number of seats (125 seats, later 129 seats after absorbing four former independents), compared to 70 for the PPD, 59 for the RDP and 35 for the NRDP.

Second, the DJP, NDRP and the RDP merged into the DLP in January 1990. While the DJP remained the largest party in the Assembly after the 1988 election, it nevertheless lacked a majority and Roh and the DJP leadership began to consider a merger with opposition parties to reinforce their hold on the assembly. The media and indeed, the Assembly members themselves, expected one of two mergers. A DJP-NDRP merger would achieve a simple majority (164 out of 299 seats) by combining two post-authoritarian parties with similarly conservative orientations. Another was a RDP-PPD merger, which would produce a pan-democratic party that matched the DJP's 129 seats. In contrast, a DJP-PPD merger would produce a party embodying radically different ideologies and policy platforms, but nevertheless commanding a large majority (199) of seats. This merger was widely speculated upon by newspaper reports in late 1989 (Kim 1997). Indeed, a high-ranking DJP member later stated in his memoirs that the DJP first proposed a

merger to the PPD, and merged with the RDP and the NDRP because DJ rejected the original proposal (Park 2005). The actual DJP-NDRP-RDP merger came as a surprise to most Korean citizens and scholars. Many believed that the RDP was too ideologically different from the DJP and NDRP. Yet, only five RDP members acted against the merger despite the ideological gap and their exclusion from secretive negotiations only known to top party members. The five dissenters who refused the merger eventually joined the PPD, demonstrating that rank-and-file members could defy YS. Indeed, the leader of these defectors (Roh Moo-hyun) later won the presidency with DJ's support. This makes the acquiescence of other RDP members even more puzzling. Another puzzle is why YS accepted a similar merger to the one DJ rejected.

The 1990 merger has received considerable attention from political scientists, who have mostly proposed rational choice explanations. Cotton (1992) argues that authoritarian rulers repeatedly co-opted Korean opposition parties from Syngman Rhee onwards, and that the merger was only the latest incident in this tradition. Slater and Wong (2014) describe the merger as the DJP's effort to co-opt an opposition party in order to sustain and even enlarge its political strength under democratic rule. Kim (1997) has provided perhaps the most detailed explanation, leveraging coalition theory to explain why the merger took place rather than one of the more plausible alternatives. In this study, we complement the rational choice approach by proposing that social ties among politicians played a critical role in shaping post-authoritarian political interactions that eventually decided the long-term political terrain of a democratized Korea. The following empirical section elaborates how social ties among politicians affect their strategic decisions during democratic transition.

Empirical Specification

Data and Variables

We examine ties between politicians elected to the 13th National Assembly (1988-1992). We focus on Assembly members not only because they constituted nearly the entirety of important political actors during Korea's democratic transition, but also because party leaders had incentives to achieve supermajority, simple majority or largest opposition party status in the Assembly.³ We chose dyads of Assembly members as our unit of analysis to relate party boundaries (i.e. whether or not two Assembly members belonged to the same party) with social affiliations including school and regional ties, accounting for instrumental affiliations indicative of their ideological similarity. We used data from the Stanford Dataset on the Korean National Assembly, which was coded from the Republic of Korea National Election Commission (2007), the Republic of Korea National Assembly (1998) and the *Choinsŭ Inmul Chŏngbo* database on prominent Koreans (2005). Of the 299 members of the Assembly, data on social relationships was available for 293 members. The 42,778 possible dyads between these 293 Assembly members represent our sample.

To analyze how social affiliations affect the boundaries of a political party, we coded if a dyad of Assembly members belonged to the same party. We code party boundaries as a dichotomous characteristic of dyads of Assembly members to make them commensurate with other characteristics of dyads including social and instrumental affiliations. If both members in a dyad are affiliated with the same party, their dyad is coded 1. If two members belong to different parties, the dyad is coded 0. Considering how radically party boundaries shifted after the 1990 merger, we coded this variable once as of the 1988 election and once again after the 1990 merger. While DJP, RDP and NDRP members would be coded as belonging to different parties as of 1988, they would be coded as belonging to the same party after 1990.

We then code variables for key social affiliations. The importance of social ties in the Korean context has long been recognized (e.g. Yee 2000; Ha 2007). Three types of ties have the most importance in Korea. As might be expected, kinship ties with immediate and extended family members are considered the most important. Yet, trust between high school classmates nearly reaches that found between family members.⁴ Strong relationships are also found between individuals originating from the same regions (Yee 2000). The family-school-regional nexus is so prevalent that it shapes business and politics in profound ways.⁵ We code a dyad of Assembly members as *sharing the same regional origin* if they were born in the same province in present-day South or North Korea. We coded a dyad as having a *high school alumni affiliation* if both members spent any time attending the same high school. We did not code *kinship* among Assembly members, as our data indicated that no dyads of family members served together in the 13th Assembly. We also coded a social affiliation that is considered less important than region and high school alumni relationships but nevertheless worth noting, *membership in the same civil society organizations*. We differentiated organizations that were implicitly politicized from those that were not. Either way, past experiences working together in voluntary organizations could generate trust that would enable political cooperation.

To control for ideological similarity, we code affiliations pertaining to Assembly members' ideological leanings. We coded a dyad as *members of the same past political parties* if they belonged to the same political parties prior to the 13th session, regardless whether they were Assembly members at the time. We coded this affiliation as a valued tie, with some dyads sharing membership in several prior parties. We also coded a dyad as *members of the same quasi-parties* if they belonged to one of four organizations that functioned like parties. The *minjuhwa chujin hyupuihwoe* (Council for the Promotion of Democracy) was founded by YS and

DJ in 1984 to carry out pro-democracy activities under political repression, and was merged into the New Korean Democratic Party in 1985. YS also founded the *minju sanhakhwoe* (Mountaineering Club for Democracy) for his own supporters. The *hanahoe*, a secret society of elite military officers led by Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, constituted the core of the 1980 coup. Most *hanahoe* members held high political office during Chun's regime. The *yushin jeongwoohwoe* (Committee for Revitalizing Reform) consisted of proportional representatives nominated by President Park Chung-hee under the authoritarian 1972 constitution. This group served as Park's personal delegates in the Assembly and functioned as a separate political party from the DJP. Finally, we coded if both members of a dyad belonged to *the same advisor* groups. Senior political figures received advice from official legislative aides, political party advisors and policy advisors, as well as unofficial personal advisors. Not only did these advisors build enduring relationships with the leaders they advised, but they also built ties amongst themselves. Advisor groups as the DJ's *Donggyodong* faction and YS's *Sangdodong* faction were cohesive not only ideologically but also socially. Taken as a whole, shared membership in past political parties, quasi-parties and advisor groups feature both ideological affinity and social cohesion. Controlling for these affiliations makes it possible to observe the independent effects of regional, high school and other social affiliations.

Methods

We analyze the relationship between membership in the same political party and social or political affiliations in two ways. First, we visualize connection patterns for each type of affiliation using multidimensional scaling (MDS), a descriptive technique of arranging nodes (i.e. what is connected) in two dimensions based on their pattern of connections.⁶ More strongly-tied

nodes are clustered near one another in two-dimensional space, while more weakly-tied or disconnected nodes are repelled apart. The nodes in these analyses are the four political parties as of 1988, as well as other relevant social or political entities. These nodes are tied by aggregate individual-level connections, where connections between individual members of these nodes are taken as connections between the nodes themselves. This technique shows the pattern of individual-level connections linking various parties and social or political entities, and consequently, how various affiliations connect pre-merger parties with one another.

Second, we conduct logistic regressions estimating the likelihood that two individuals belong to the same party. While MDS provides an intuitive visual representation of the affiliations between parties, it nevertheless cannot tease apart the effects of different types of affiliations. Also, regression analyses provide a stronger basis for making causal inferences, especially in the absence of endogeneity. Indeed, the time lag between the social affiliations (coded prior to 1988) and the two dependent variables (coded as of 1988 and 1990) reduces endogeneity concerns. Logistic regression is employed since the dependent variables are dichotomous outcomes, to estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Current parties}_{[i,j]} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{past parties}_{[i,j]} + \beta_2 * \text{quasi parties}_{[i,j]} + \beta_3 * \\ & \text{advisor groups}_{[i,j]} + \beta_4 * \text{regional origins}_{[i,j]} + \beta_5 * \text{high schools}_{[i,j]} + \beta_6 * \\ & \text{nonpoliticized CSOs}_{[i,j]} + \beta_7 * \text{politicized CSOs}_{[i,j]} + \varepsilon_{[i,j]}, \end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable is whether Assembly members i and j now belong to the same political party; the explanatory variables are social and political affiliations. Political affiliations show whether i and j were affiliated to the same party in the past, included in the same advisory group, or were members of the same political gatherings. Social affiliations indicate whether politicians

i and j are from the same regions, attended the same high school, or had membership at non-political civil organizations.⁷

Empirical Results

Multidimensional Scaling (MDS)

Figures 1 through 4 illustrate social networks of Assembly members from the 13th National Assembly (1988-1992). These figures show that social and political ties among Assembly members are stronger among DJP, NDRP and RDP members, while PPD members largely do not share connection with any of the other parties. Figure 1 shows Assembly members' regional origins as well as the political parties circa 1988:

---Figure 1 about here---

In this diagram, light-colored circles (i.e. nodes) represent pre-merger political parties and dark-colored circles represent provinces of origin. Lines (i.e. connections) represent the individuals in a given political party who were born in a given province. Thicker lines indicate a greater number of affiliations. MDS clusters nodes that are more strongly connected, but push apart those that are unaffiliated. Thus, two nodes that are closer together in the diagram can be interpreted as being more strongly affiliated with each other, or indirectly affiliated by their mutual connections with a third node. Interpreted in this manner, Figure 1 shows unsurprisingly strong correspondences between the DJP and the RDP with the Gyeongsang region, the NDRP with the Chungcheong region and the PPD with the Jeolla region. What is perhaps more surprising is the considerable overlap between the DJP, RDP and NDRP and the degree to which

the PPD and the Jeolla region are isolated.

High school affiliations parallel regional patterns, perhaps unsurprisingly considering that most high school students typically remain in their home regions.

---Figure 2 about here---

As Figure 2 shows, the DJP, RDP and NDRP draw heavily from graduates of schools in their home regions but also include many members who graduated from schools outside their home regions, especially from Seoul and Gyeonggi Province. Thus, many high school affiliations cut across these parties. In contrast, a higher proportion of PPD members graduated from Jeolla high schools, especially Gwangju #1 High School, and the PPD is consequently more isolated.

The PPD was isolated even in civil society sectors unrelated to regional origins. Figures 3 and 4 show Assembly members' shared memberships in non-politicized and politicized civil society organizations:

---Figure 3 about here---

---Figure 4 about here---

In both diagrams, the RDP was affiliated with the PPD and the DJP, occupying an intermediate position. Despite the RDP's ideological proximity to the PPD, however, the RDP did not have meaningfully stronger ties to the PPD than the DJP. This is somewhat surprising especially in Figure 4, where civil society organizations reflected not only social cohesion but also ideological leanings. One possible explanation is that RDP members had been allowed to participate in

organizations such as the Seoul Olympic Committee and UNESCO as Assembly members alongside DJP members under authoritarian rule, when PPD members were excluded from the political process altogether. Overall, these findings support the proposition that regions of origin, high schools and other social affiliations share a general pattern where the DJP, NDRP and the RDP are cohesively connected, while the PPD remains isolated.

Unlike social ties that isolate the PPD, analyses of ideologically-driven affiliations clearly indicate that the ideological divide separates the post-authoritarian DJP and NDRP from the pro-democratic PPD and the RDP. Figure 5 shows not only the parties as of the 1988 election but also historical parties that Assembly members were previously affiliated with. Each link between parties represents an individual who was a member of both parties:

---Figure 5 about here---

The core of this network consists of two distinct clusters. One cluster is constituted of the DJP and the NDRP from the 13th session, as well as past authoritarian parties such as the Republican Party and earlier incarnations of the DJP. The other cluster includes the RDP and the PPD from the 13th Assembly, as well as past democratic parties such as the Democratic Party, the Democratic Korea Party and the New Korea Democratic Party. This pattern highlights the ideological divide separating the DJP and NDRP on one hand with the RDP and the PPD on the other.

Quasi-party affiliations show a similar pattern. Indeed, the polarization between post-authoritarian and pro-democratic parties is so clear that it can be described without visualization. The *minjuhwa chujin hyupuihwoe* is associated only with the RDP and the PPD, while the *minju*

sanhakhwoe is associated with only the RDP. In contrast, the *hanahwoe* and the *yushin jeongwoohwoe* are respectively associated with the DJP and the NDRP. The existence of two entirely separate groups (i.e. components) clearly indicates ideological polarization.

Finally, advisor group affiliations show a somewhat different pattern. Figure 6 shows affiliations linking important advisor groups and parties:

---Figure 6 about here---

Not surprisingly, there is a strong relationship between specific advisor groups and parties. To the very limited extent that members of the same advisor group belong to different parties, the RDP is as strongly connected to the DJP as the PPD. This suggests a dearth of strong ties linking the *Sangdodong* faction at the core of the RDP with the *Donggyodong* faction at the core of the PPD, removing one possible link between these rival democratic parties despite their shared ideology and policy platforms.

Regression Analysis

The results of our regression analysis, presented in Table 1, provide further support for our argument that social affiliations reduce the cost or difficulty of merging three parties. The models demonstrate that the social affiliations of interest are positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of a dyad belonging to the same party, both before and after the 1990 merger. Yet, the models demonstrate that some but not all ideologically-driven political affiliations are positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of a dyad belonging to the same party. The analyses show that political networks effectively predict the probability of

party affiliation before the 1990 merger, but not afterwards. Indeed, quasi-party membership is negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of belonging to the same party after the merger.

---Table 1 here---

In Table 1, our unit of analysis is a dyad of two legislative members in the 13th National Assembly. Models 1 to 3 estimate the likelihood that both members in a dyad belong to the same party before the 1990 merger. In Model 1, we test how ideological affinity affects party affiliation, followed by Model 2 where we examine the effect of social ties on party affiliation. Model 3 includes both ideological and social affinity variables. Two of the three indicators of ideological affinity, membership in the same past parties and advisor groups, are positively and significantly associated with belonging to the same party. The third indicator, membership in the same quasi-parties, has no significant effect, as members of the largest quasi-party, the *minjuhwa chujin hyupuihoe*, are split between the RDP and the PPD. In contrast, all four indicators of social affiliation are positively and significantly associated with belonging to the same party. These findings suggest that the boundaries of the pre-merger political parties were shaped by both ideological affinity and social affiliation, with the caveat that members of a key pro-democracy quasi-party were split between the RDP and the PPD.

Models 4 to 6 estimate the likelihood that a dyad belongs to the same party after the 1990 merger. Again we include ideological affinity and social network first in separate models (Model 4 and 5) and then together (Model 6). In these models, only one of the three indicators of ideological affinity, membership in the same advisor groups, is positively and significantly

associated with belonging to the same party. Furthermore, membership in the same quasi-parties is actually negatively and significantly associated with belonging to the same party. To the extent that membership in the quasi-parties represents ideological affinity, this indicates that a dyad sharing the same ideology is more likely to be split into different parties. In contrast, all four indicators of social affiliation remain positively and significantly associated with belonging to the same party. These findings suggest that the boundaries of the post-merger parties were shaped more by social affiliation than ideological affinity, and even suggest that social affiliations overrode ideological affinities.

Model fitness (LR χ^2) changes drastically after the merger, which also supports our claim. Before the merger, Model 1, which includes only ideological affinity variables (LR $\chi^2 = 1670.08$) fits better than Model 2, which includes only social ties (1066.88). After the merger, Model 4 (271.61), which parallels Model 1, fits far worse than Model 5 (996.03), which parallels Model 2. This finding highlights the limited value of ideological affinity as an explanation for post-merger party membership.

Discussion

Our findings complement rational choice analyses of the DJP-NDRP-RDP merger, providing key contextual elements that shaped party leaders' cost and incentive structures. As discussed earlier, Kim (1997) employs rational choice theory to understand party dynamics during Korean democratic transition. He argues that the DJP, NDRP and RDP faced incentives to maximize the number of seats they controlled in the Assembly. He applies coalition theory to explain the Korean case because coalition theory views inter-party alliances as consequences of incentive structures. Depending on the incentives they faced, parties seek votes, office or specific policies

(see Strom 1990 for a review). In this case, Kim concludes that DJP leaders pursued the merger with the RDP and the NDRP to obtain a two-thirds supermajority needed for a constitutional amendment.

Although this account highlights the incentives for some kind of merger, it nevertheless remains unconvincing regarding why the three-way merger occurred instead of several plausible alternatives. First, the account does not convincingly explain why the PPD and the RDP did not reunite. As Kim (1997) emphasizes, DJ and YS were rivals since the 1968 election and largely distrusted each other afterwards (Kang 2003). Furthermore, YS had extreme difficulty trusting DJ after he defected from the RDP in October 1987 (Park 1990). Yet, YS and DJ had previously overcome mutual distrust to successfully cooperate in the 1985 election and the pro-democracy uprising. Furthermore, such accounts take a top-down approach, explicitly assuming that “in the Korean context of coalition bargaining in 1990, party members’ preferences coincided with their leaders’ preferences” (Kim 1997, 86). Yet, the post-merger defection of Roh Moo-hyun and four other members of the RDP demonstrated that this assumption was not entirely true. The problematic nature of authority, particularly under the extreme uncertainty faced by political actors during democratic transitions, highlights the need to broadly investigate how social incentives and constraints factor into the rational choices made by those actors.

Additionally, the account does not convincingly rule out the possibility of a DJP-PPD merger, which would have controlled only one seat less than a two-thirds supermajority. With 199 of 299 Assembly seats, a merged party would have needed to recruit only one of the six remaining independents to pass a constitutional amendment. Such a merger would also have had the benefit of broadening the party’s support base, including not only the DJP’s conservative voters from the Gyeongsang region, but also the PPD’s liberal voters from the Jeolla region. One

possibility is that authoritarian rulers had treated DJ far more harshly than YS, making DJ far less inclined to cooperate with post-authoritarian figures. Yet, DJ later showed that he could work with post-authoritarians. For instance, JP had founded the Korean Central Intelligence Agency under authoritarian rule, the same agency that had kidnapped DJ from a Japanese hotel room and would have assassinated him had the United States not intervened. Yet, DJ was able to put old differences aside, allying with JP to win the 1997 presidential election. Afterwards, he appointed JP to head his cabinet.⁸ What is needed is a method of ruling out these counterfactuals by more clearly discerning the incentives faced by party leaders and rank-and-file members. Our findings fill this gap, suggesting that social network structure facilitated the observed DJP-NDRP-RDP merger and constrained leaders from pursuing the PPD-RDP and the DJP-PPD alternatives.

The salience of regional affiliations in our analysis bears special mention. Regional identities are considered to be particularly important in Korean politics, as political mobilization based on regional origins has long been considered a key source of political cleavages. Indeed, the rivalry between the conservative Gyeongsang and liberal Jeolla regions has been considered the most salient cleavage in Korean politics since the 1988 elections, affecting a wide range of political outcomes including party membership, candidate nomination and the probability of winning elections (Cho 1998, Park 2003, Kim et al. 2008, Hong and Park 2015). From this perspective, our finding that regional origins bear strongly upon party membership is not at all surprising. What is more interesting, however, is that high school affiliations had a positive and significant effect on membership in the same party even after controlling for regional origins. While high school affiliations were correlated with regional origins ($r = 0.15$), our findings indicate that high school affiliations had a large and significant effect that was independent of

regionalism. Furthermore, membership in the same civil society organizations was uncorrelated with regional origin ($r = 0.02$ and $r = 0.00$ respectively for politicized and non-politicized civil society organizations), but nevertheless had independent and significant effects on membership in the same party. Taken together, these findings suggest that social affiliations had importance beyond what could be explained by regionalism alone, so that regionalism represents only one of several important social affiliations to consider when analyzing Korean politics. Indeed, the DJP's initial courting of the PPD as a potential merger partner, as well as DJ's refusal of this offer, demonstrate both the limits and importance of regionalism as an explanation.

Our findings bridge the gap between the Kim's (1997) rational choice explanation and the observed DJP-NDRP-RDP merger outcome. Coalition theory convincingly predicts that some kind of merger should occur between the four major parties after the 1988 elections. What this theory predicts less convincingly is the specific choice of mergers from three alternative configurations that offer comparable benefits. Taking a social networks approach shows the cost or difficulty of implementing each of these alternative configurations, and using this theory and methodology, we show that members of DJP-NDRP-RDP were interconnected with dense family, school or regional ties. Alternative mergers such as RDP-PPD or DJP-PPD did not materialize because the PPD was largely disconnected with the other two parties, and was indeed socially isolated. As a consequence, our regression analysis shows that party members within the same party share strong social networks but weak political and ideological similarities after the merger.

Conclusion

In this paper, we show that a social cleavage between the RDP and the PPD facilitated their 1987 split despite their shared ideology, and that the same social cleavage, in conjunction with the

social cohesion found among the DJP, NDRP and the RDP, facilitated the 1990 DJP-NDRP-RDP merger. The MDS diagrams indicate that an ideological cleavage splits the DJP and the NDRP on one hand and the RDP and the PPD on the other. At the same time, however, the diagrams also show a social cleavage between the DJP, NDRP and the RDP on one hand and the PPD on the other. These cleavages manifest themselves in confirmatory regression analyses. Party boundaries as of the 1988 legislative election, which were outcomes of the RDP-PPD split, were more conclusively influenced by social affiliations than ideological affinities, as demonstrated by the insignificant effect of quasi-parties. Indeed, the positive and significant effects exerted by all four social affiliations demonstrate that the RDP-PPD split did not cut against many social affiliations. Party boundaries as of 1990, the outcome of the DJP-NDRP-RDP merger, remained significantly and positively associated with social affiliations. However, the new boundaries cut across one key measure of ideological affinity, membership in the same quasi-parties. This indicates party members after the merger were ideologically even further from one another, while their social affinity sustained intra-party cohesion.

These findings are consistent with the idea that the presence of social affiliations would reduce the cost or difficulty of a DJP-NDRP-RDP merger, but that the absence of such ties would increase the cost or difficulty of a DJP-PPD or even a RDP-PPD merger. The dominant rational choice explanation for the three-party merger (Kim 1997) convincingly demonstrates that the parties had strong incentives to merge. However, this explanation does not satisfactorily explain why the DJP-NDRP-RDP merger occurred instead of plausible alternatives involving RDP-PPD or DJP-PPD mergers. Our findings support the proposition that cross-cutting social ties or affiliations lower the cost or difficulty of mergers, while the absence of such ties or affiliations raises the costs and difficulty.

We argue that this general approach could yield insights over a broad range of situations where coalition theory in specific and rational choice theory in general seems to lack explanatory power at first glance. Ostrom (1998) highlighted the need for rational choice theories of collective action to take reciprocity, reputation and trust into account. Similarly, Knoke (1994) advocated social network analysis as a supplement to rational choice approaches, as social network analysis yields crucial insights about the external contexts and incentive structures that rational actors face. Indeed, how social networks shape contexts and incentive structures largely parallels how institutions do so, leaving few barriers to a synthesis between the rational choice and social network approaches.

Our findings pose theoretical implications about how authoritarian parties survive during democratic transitions, and what their survival means over the long term. We extend Loxton's (2015) argument that post-authoritarian parties leverage the resources they had accumulated while in power to expand their political base, introducing social ties as such a resource. Our findings also contribute to a growing literature on the ambiguous role of authoritarian parties during democratic transitions. Along with the Taiwanese and Mexican cases, the Korean case shows that the integration of post-authoritarian parties into an emerging democratic system induces a stable transition to democracy (O'Donnell 1986; Slater and Wong 2014). Yet, such a transition also allows aspects of authoritarianism to persist in the new democracy, including individual politicians, political practices and especially resource distributions. We contribute towards this literature by showing that the social embeddedness of post-authoritarian parties into the emerging democratic regime contributes to both the beneficial and negative effects.

Our findings also yield insights about the development of Korean democracy. Although the 1990 merger occurred 25 years ago, its impact on Korean democracy remains profound. The

merger was the watershed event that enabled the post-authoritarian party to sustain political leverage in a democratized political environment, and indeed, remain the most powerful political party in South Korea. It was only in 1997, 10 years after the democratization, when the opposition finally won its first presidential election. The DLP and its successors have only lost presidential elections twice (1997, 2002) and legislative elections only once (2004). Furthermore, the current president of South Korea, Park Geun Hye, is the daughter of a former dictator and has appointed many of her father's confidantes to key policy positions. The continuity of the DLP through democratic transition and consolidation not only shows how authoritarian incumbents can survive and even thrive, but also how they can anchor ideological conservatives into an irreversibly democratic political regime.

References

- Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arnold, Laura W., Rebecca E. Deen and Samuel C. Patterson. 2000. "Friendship and Votes: The Impact of Interpersonal Ties on Legislative Decision Making". *State and Local Government Review* 32(2): 142-147.
- Baker, W. E. (1990). Market networks and corporate behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*: 96(3): 589-625.
- Batagelj, V., & Mrvar, A. (1998). Pajek-program for large network analysis. *Connections*, 21(2): 47-57.
- Bélanger, É. and Godbout, J. F. (2010). Why do parties merge? The case of the Conservative party of Canada. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63 (1): 41-65.
- Denver, D. T. (1983). The SDP-Liberal alliance: the end of the two-party system? *West European Politics*, 6(4), 75-102.
- Burt, R. S. (1992). *Structural Holes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Caldeira, Gregory A. and Samuel C. Patterson. 1987. "Political Friendship in the Legislature". *Journal of Politics* 49(4): 953-975.
- Chang, C. S., & Chang, N. J. (1994). *The Korean management system: Cultural, political, economic foundations*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Cheng, T. J. (2006). Strategizing Party Adaptation The Case of the Kuomintang. *Party Politics*, 12(3): 367-394.
- Cho, K. (1998). Regionalism in Korean elections and democratization: an empirical analysis. *Asian Perspective* 22(1): 135-156.
- Choinsŭ Inmul Chŏngbo Database. (2005). Retrieved July–August 2005 from <http://people.join.com>
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94: S95-S120.
- Cotton, J. (1992). Understanding the State in South Korea Bureaucratic-Authoritarian or State Autonomy Theory? *Comparative Political Studies* 24(4), 512-531.
- Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, L. J., Linz, J. J., & Lipset, S. M. (1989). Introduction: Politics Society and Democracy in Latin America. In J. J. Linz & S. M. Lipset (Eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Vol. 4), Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *Journal of Political Economy* 65(2): 135-150.

Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. (B. North & R. North, Trans.). London: Methuen.

Fruchterman, T. M., & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed placement. *Softw., Pract. Exper.*, 21(11), 1129-1164.

Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6): 1360-1380.

Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology* 91(3): 481-510.

Granovetter, M. (1995). Coase revisited: Business groups in the modern economy. *Industrial and corporate change*, 4(1), 93-130.

Ha, Y. C. (2007). Late Industrialization, the State, and Social Changes The Emergence of Neofamilism in South Korea. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(4): 363-382.

Harmel, R., & Robertson, J. D. (1985). Formation and Success of New Parties A Cross-National Analysis. *International Political Science Review* 6(4): 501-523.

Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2007). *Democratic politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ji Yeon Hong and Sunkyoung Park. (2015). Factories for votes? How dictators gain popular support using targeted industrial policy. *British Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.

Hug, S. (2001). *Altering party systems: strategic behavior and the emergence of new political parties in Western democracies*. University of Michigan Press.

Hunter, D. R., Handcock, M.S., Butts, C.T., Goodreau, S.M. & Morris, M. (2008). ergm: A Package to Fit, Simulate and Diagnose Exponential-Family Models for Networks. *Journal of Statistical Software* 24(3): 1-29.

Ishiyama, J. T. (1998). Strange bedfellows: explaining political cooperation between communist successor parties and nationalists in Eastern Europe. *Nations and Nationalism* 4(1): 61-85.

Janda, K. (1980). *Political parties: A cross-national survey*. New York: Free Press.

- Kang, J. (2003). *A Walk to Korean Contemporary History* [in Korean]. Seoul, Korea: Inmulguasasangsa.
- Kim, H. [HeeMin]. (1997). Rational Choice Theory and Third World Politics: The 1990 Party Merger in Korea. *Comparative Politics* 30(1): 83-100.
- Kim, H. [HeeMin], Choi, J. Y., & Cho, J. (2008). Changing cleavage structure in new democracies: An empirical analysis of political cleavages in Korea. *Electoral studies* 27(1): 136-150.
- Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R., & Toka, G. (1999). *Post-communist party systems: competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Knoke, D. (1994). *Political networks: the structural perspective* (Vol. 4). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kohno, M. (1997). *Japan's postwar party politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Korea National Election Commission. (2007). Jungang Seongeo Gwalli Wiwonhoe Seongeo Tonggye Sistem, Retrieved July–August 2007 from <http://info.nec.go.kr>.
- Krackhardt, D. (1988). Predicting with networks: Nonparametric multiple regression analysis of dyadic data. *Social Networks* 10, 359- 381.
- Lee, S., & Brinton, M. C. (1996). Elite education and social capital: The case of South Korea. *Sociology of Education* 69(3): 177-192.
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, S. R., & Way, L. A. (2012). Beyond patronage: violent struggle, ruling party cohesion, and authoritarian durability. *Perspectives on Politics* 10(04): 869-889.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1990). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In P. Mair (Eds.), *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Loxton, J. (2015). Authoritarian Successor Parties. *Journal of Democracy* 26(3): 157-170.
- Marland, A., & Flanagan, T. (2013). Brand new party: Political branding and the Conservative Party of Canada. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 951-972.
- McCann, J. A. (2014). Time to Turn Back the Clock?. In J. I. Domínguez, K. F. Greene, C. H. Lawson & A. Moreno (Eds.), *Mexico's Evolving Democracy: A Comparative Study of the 2012 Elections*. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 415-444.

Michels, R. (1915). *Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy*. Hearst's International Library Company.

Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. *Academy of Management Review* 23(2): 242-266.

O'donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C. & L. Whitehead (1990). *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Olson, D. M. (1998). Party formation and party system consolidation in the new democracies of Central Europe. *Political Studies* 46(3): 432-464.

Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 1-22.

Padgett, J. F., & Ansell, C. K. (1993). Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1259-1319.

Park, B. G. (2003). Territorialized party politics and the politics of local economic development: State-led industrialization and political regionalism in South Korea. *Political Geography*, 22(8), 811-839.

Park, C. U. (2005). *A Testimony for the Right History*. Seoul, Korea: Random House Korea.

Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2001). D-nominate after 10 years: A comparative update to congress: A political-economic history of roll-call voting. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 5-29.

Poole, K. T. (2005). *Spatial models of parliamentary voting*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Powell, G. B. (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither Market Nor Hierarchy. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 12:295-336.

Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1994). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton university press.

Republic of Korea National Assembly. (1998). 50th Anniversary Commemorative Volume.

Shepsle, K. A., & Bonchek, M. S. (1997). *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behaviour and Institutions*. New York: Norton.

- Siegel, J. (2007). Contingent political capital and international alliances: Evidence from South Korea. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 52(4), 621-666.
- Simon, H. A. (1985). Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. *American Political Science Review*, 79(02), 293-304.
- Slater, D., & Wong, J. (2013). The strength to concede: ruling parties and democratization in developmental Asia. *Perspectives on Politics*, 11(03), 717-733.
- Strom, K. (1990). A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. *American journal of political science*, 565-598.
- Studlar, D. T., & McAllister, I. (1996). Constituency activity and representational roles among Australian legislators. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(01), 69-90.
- Tavits, M. (2008). Party systems in the making: The emergence and success of new parties in new democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(01), 113-133.
- Tien, H. M. (Ed.). (1996). *Taiwan's electoral politics and democratic transition: riding the third wave*. ME Sharpe.
- Tsai, W. (2000). The Formation of Intraorganizational Linkages. *Strategic Management Journal* 21(9): 925-939.
- Uzzi, B. (1996). The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of organizations: The network effect. *American Sociological Review*, 674-698.
- Uzzi, B. (1997). Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of embeddedness. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 42(1), 35-67.
- Van Biezen, I. (2005). Terrorism and democratic legitimacy: conflicting interpretations of the Spanish elections. *Mediterranean Politics*, 10(1), 99-108.
- Ward, M. D., K. Stoval and A. Sacks. 2011. Network Analysis and Political Science. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14, 245-264.
- Yee, J. (2000). The Social Networks of Koreans. *Korea Journal*, 40(1), 325-352.
- Zhao, Z. J., & Anand, J. (2013). Beyond boundary spanners: The 'collective bridge' as an efficient interunit structure for transferring collective knowledge. *Strategic Management Journal*, 34(13), 1513-1530.


Table 1: Estimated Likelihood that Dyad Members are Belong to the Same Party

	Before the 1990 merger			After the 1990 merger		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>Ideological affinity</u>						
Past parties	0.99*** (0.15)		0.98*** (0.15)	0.22 (0.12)		0.20 (0.13)
Quasi-parties	0.21 (0.19)		0.19 (0.18)	-0.60** (0.17)		-0.64*** (0.18)
Advisor group	2.95*** (0.45)		2.93*** (0.44)	2.58** (0.78)		2.54** (0.79)
<u>Social ties</u>						
Regional origin		0.89*** (0.11)	0.88*** (0.12)		1.01*** (0.15)	1.01*** (0.15)
High school		0.58** (0.19)	0.55** (0.19)		0.64** (0.24)	0.62** (0.24)
Non-politicized CSO		0.66** (0.21)	0.60** (0.23)		0.60* (0.28)	0.58* (0.28)
Politicized CSO		1.72*** (0.44)	1.77*** (0.46)		1.21* (0.57)	1.26* (0.58)
Constant	-1.16*** (0.06)	-1.10*** (0.07)	-1.30*** (0.07)	0.31** (0.10)	0.21* (0.09)	0.19* (0.10)
LR χ^2	1670.08***	1066.88***	2697.46***	271.61***	996.03***	1253.00***
N	42778	42778	42778	42778	42778	42778

Analysis limited to dyads of 293 National Assembly members for whom data was available. Logistic regression coefficients are shown. Standard errors clustered on both members of a dyad.


* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed test.

Figure 1: Birth Province of Party Members




Note: Light-colored nodes indicate political parties as of the 1988 general elections. Dark-colored nodes indicate birth provinces.

Figure 2: High Schools of Party Members




Note: Light-colored nodes indicate political parties as of the 1988 general elections. Dark-colored nodes indicate high schools.

Figure 3: Membership in the Same Civil Society Organizations Not Involved in Political Activities up to 1988




Note: Light-colored nodes indicate political parties as of the 1988 general elections. Dark-colored nodes indicate non-politicized civil society organizations.

Figure 4: Membership in the Same Civil Society Organizations Involved in Political Activities up to 1988




Note: Light-colored nodes indicate political parties as of the 1988 general elections. Dark-colored nodes indicate politicized civil society organizations.

Figure 5: Membership in the Same Parties Prior to 1988



Note: Light-colored nodes indicate political parties as of the 1988 general elections. Dark-colored nodes indicate political parties prior to 1988.

Figure 6: Important Advisor Groups



Note: Light-colored nodes indicate political parties as of the 1988 general elections. Dark-colored nodes indicate leader-centered *advisor* groups.

Endnotes

¹ Knoke (1994) suggests that social network analysis is a natural complement to rational choice analyses, which can illuminate elements of a rational actor's context that shape incentive structures and strategic outcomes.

² For instance, coalitions should be more prevalent in disproportional electoral systems where larger groups can gain disproportionately strong control of the government (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). Empirical studies have found that disproportional electoral systems also feature fewer but larger political parties (Liphart 1994, Cox, 1997).

³ Of the 299 members in the Assembly, 224 were elected directly from districts and 75 were elected by proportional representation. Both types served four-year terms, carrying them through the 1990 merger. Key party members who lost local elections would be elected as proportional representatives, so that the Assembly represented nearly the entirety of important political actors.

⁴ Responses to a survey by Chang and Chang (1994) reported the average level of trust between high school classmates to be 97 percent of the average level found between family members.

⁵ Lee and Brinton (1996) found that having the same college background as a potential employer significantly increased the chance of employment. Siegel (2007) found that being tied through elite sociopolitical networks to the regime in power significantly increased the rate at which South Korean companies formed cross-border strategic alliances.

⁶ We use the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm (1991) as implemented in the Pajek 4.01 software package (Batagelj and Mrvar 1998), beginning from the baseline circular configuration.

⁷ Two alternative methods could potentially be used to estimate dyadic relationships. First, we could have used the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (i.e. QAP; see Krackhardt 1988). QAP permutes the rows and columns of adjacency matrices to eliminate intra-class correlations before estimating standard errors. Instead, we used two-way clustering of standard errors and estimated logistic regression models, which also estimated unbiased standard errors while using a method more familiar to most social scientists. Second, we could have used exponential random graph models (ERGM), a method that has gained popularity among social network analysts (Hunter et al 2008). ERGMs are optimized for dichotomous network data, leaving it unsuitable for count data like membership in past political parties. Rather than dichotomize valued data, we chose to use logistic regression.

⁸ To date, Korea retains a presidency rather than a parliamentary system. JP was appointed as Prime Minister after DJ's victory in the 1997 presidential election, which was the second most important position in the Korean government after the presidency.